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Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization
PATTI TAMARA LENARD University of Ottawa
Are democratic states permitted to denationalize citizens, in particular those whom they believepose dangers to the physical safety of others? In this article, I argue that they are not. The powerto denationalize citizens—that is, to revoke citizenship—is one that many states have historically
claimed for themselves, but which has largely been in disuse in the last several decades. Recent terrorist
events have, however, prompted scholars and political actors to reconsider the role that denationalization
can and perhaps should play in democratic states, in particular with respect to its role in protecting
national security and in supporting the global fight against terror more generally. In this article, my
objective is to show that denationalization laws have no place in democratic states. To understand why, I
propose examining the foundations of the right of citizenship, which lie, I shall argue, in the very strong
interests that individuals have in security of residence. I use this formulation of the right to respond to
two broad clusters of arguments: (1) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize citizens who
threaten to undermine the safety of citizens in a democratic state or the ability of a democratic state to
function as a democratic state, and (2) those that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize dual citizens
because they possess citizenship status in a second country that is also able to protect their rights.
A re democratic states permitted to denationalizecitizens, in particular those whom they believepose dangers to the physical safety of others?
In this article, I argue that they are not. The power to
denationalize citizens—that is, to revoke citizenship—
is one that many states have historically claimed for
themselves, but which has largely been in disuse in the
last several decades. Recent terrorist events have, how-
ever, prompted scholars and political actors to recon-
sider the role that denationalization can and perhaps
should play in democratic states, in particular with re-
spect to its role in protecting national security and in
supporting the global fight against terror more gener-
ally (Forcese 2014; Gibney 2013a; Lavi 2010; Macklin
2014). It is in this context that some states demand
the power to revoke citizenship from those who have
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committed and, in some cases, are believed to be in-
tending to commit, a series of crimes that are taken
to be “seriously prejudicial”1 to the interests of the
state and the citizens it is responsible for protecting
(Macklin and Bauböck 2015). These “seriously preju-
dicial” crimes are various, and contemporary discourse
focuses on terrorist crimes in particular. According to
some, revocation laws complement other powers—for
example, no-fly lists and passport cancelations, which
aim to restrict the mobility of possible foreign fight-
ers, and increased surveillance of communities that are
supposed to be the source of terrorism—that together
are described as forming a package that states must
adopt in order to protect their citizens from terrorism.
In this article, my objective is to show that denation-
alization laws have no place in democratic states. In
particular, I argue that none of the reasons presented in
favor of denationalization is compelling. To understand
why, I propose examining the foundations of the right
of citizenship, which lie, I shall argue, in the very strong
interests that individuals have in security of residence.
Armed with this understanding of the grounding of
the right to citizenship, I will defend the claim that
denationalization violates it.
I begin with an introduction to the revocation laws
that are under discussion in democratic states, and how
previous scholars have responded to them; the purpose
here is to situate my own argument in this small but
growing literature. I then offer an account of the right
to citizenship itself, as imposing distinct obligations on
the international and domestic orders. I argue that,
at the international level, the right to citizenship is
grounded in the importance of protecting individuals
from the harms of statelessness; the international order
has an obligation to ensure that each and every person
is a citizen of at least one country, which is responsible
for protecting their rights. I then argue that, at the
domestic level, the right to citizenship is about protect-
ing the strong interests that individuals have in staying





























































































































where they are, that is, as essential to underpinning the
confidence they need to build their life in a place, with
the expectation that they can continue to do so. I use
this formulation of the right to citizenship to defend
against claims that denationalization is permissible. I
respond to two broad clusters of arguments: (1) those
that claim that it is justifiable to denationalize citizens
who threaten to undermine the safety of citizens in a
democratic state or the ability of a democratic state
to function as a democratic state and (2) those that
claim that it is justifiable to denationalize dual citizens
because they possess citizenship status in a second
country that is also able to protect their rights. Each
of these claims has multiple variants, and I respond
to many of them over the course of the discussion. I
conclude, in sum, that denationalization is a violation
of the right to citizenship in democratic states.
DENATIONALIZATION IN DEMOCRATIC
STATES
Historically, there is nothing unusual about denation-
alization, which has taken many forms, including ban-
ishment and exile.2 Perhaps most famously (at least
among political theorists), the Ancient Athenians prac-
ticed ostracism, a process through which citizens could
elect to expel individuals who were thought to pose
dangers to democratic stability. There, expulsion wasn’t
understood as punishment, although like contempo-
rary defenses of the practice, it was defended as pro-
tective, not of national security as it is said to be now, but
of democracy itself. Variations on the practice of dena-
tionalization have persisted since then (e.g., Kingston
2005; Gibney 2013b, 647–48).
It is therefore not surprising that many contempo-
rary democracies have laws that permit the denation-
alization of citizens, under at least some circumstances.
One study of 22 European states suggests that only nine
have no legislation to permit the revocation of citizen-
ship (Government of Finland 2014). A larger study of
30 European states gives an overview of the vast range
of reasons for which states retain the right to denation-
alize (de Groot, Vink, and Honohan 2010). The reasons
range from fighting in foreign armies (sometimes only
if this fighting is against one’s state of citizenship), to
public service in a foreign state, to long-term residence
abroad, to voluntary acquisition of another citizenship,
and so on. This study found that 14 states permit de-
nationalization in cases where citizens engage in “se-
riously prejudicial behaviour,” broadly understood to
be actions that are “contrary to the interests of the
state” (de Groot, Vink, and Honohan 2010), and its
authors warn in conclusion that there is a trend towards
adopting additional legislation of this type (Ibid, 5).
For the most part, the right of states to denationalize
citizens has remained unquestioned and unexplored.
2 At this point, it is appropriate to say something about the language
I use here. Historically, states and communities have deployed many
strategies to expel individuals: exile, banishment, outlawry, expul-
sion, and so on. I use the term “denationalization” and “revocation,”
because they are those that are used in contemporary discussions.
In part, this may be because in the last several decades,
although these laws have remained available for de-
ployment, most states have chosen to denationalize
only a very small number of individuals. In practice,
they have fallen more or less into disuse across most
states. In light of this evidence, Peter Spiro suggests that
it is fair to conclude, in spite of a recent revival in public
interest in laws that permit revocation, the frequency
of, and comfort with, denationalizing citizens is at an
all-time historical low (Spiro 2011).3
There are all kinds of possible reasons to explain
their relative disuse. One main reason is that most
states acknowledge the tremendous harms of stateless-
ness (even where their denationalization laws permit
the imposition of statelessness), and so choose against
rendering an individual stateless in most cases. Another
reason is that, in many cases, denationalizing a dual
citizen makes that individual liable to deportation to a
human rights-violating state, and states recognize the
harm in that as well. Yet another reason is that states
by and large recognize the importance of cooperating
to fight global threats; denationalizing a dangerous in-
dividual from one state simply foists responsibility for
that dangerous individual onto another state.4
Yet, as I said above, states are showing renewed in-
terest in adopting and reinvigorating denationalization
laws, largely in the context of the global fight against
terror. Citing the exceptional time faced by the global
community as it confronts the increased sophistication
of terrorist groups, which intend to commit serious
harm against citizens of democratic states, defenders of
revocation laws argue that democratic states must be
prepared to act swiftly against those who pose dangers
to national security, even at the cost of undermining the
security of citizenship status. Public discourse focused
on their alleged value in offering this protection often
arises following terrorist incidents that have injured
and killed citizens. As defenders are quick to say, no
law-abiding citizens need fear denationalization laws.
As of yet, states considering the adoption or rein-
vigoration of these laws have pursued significantly
different courses of action. In the United States,
a series of Supreme Court judgements have ren-
dered denationalization effectively unconstitutional
(Weil 2012); this has not stopped a series of Amer-
ican political actors from both sides of the aisle,
as it were, to attempt to defend it nevertheless
(Savage and Hulse 2010). In 2010, Joseph Lieber-
man proposed the Expatriate Terrorists Act, which
3 Although historical forms of banishment differ in their details, they
all share (with denationalization) the withdrawal of state protec-
tion from certain individuals, typically as punishment for an alleged
wrongdoing. My argument depends on the existence of a modern
(post-World War II) conception of citizenship that is not available
historically. There is much to learn about the ways in which states
historically banished citizens, the reasons for doing so, and the per-
ception of its severity as a punishment. I thank Alan Ryan for this
observation.
4 And thus, possibly, perpetuating a race to see which state can dena-
tionalize a dual citizen faster, to avoid taking responsibility for her.
This is part of the larger problem, observed by a reviewer to this
piece, that talk of revocation focuses too much on the revoking state



























































































































Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization
if passed would have permitted the United States
to denationalize US citizens guilty of “engaging in
hostilities against the United States or providing mate-
rial support to a foreign terrorist organization” (Spiro
2014, 2171). The Act failed to pass in to law then, as
did a lightly modified Act, when reintroduced by Ted
Cruz in 2014. In France, ex-President François Hol-
lande proposed adopting a citizenship revocation law
specifically for terrorists, in the wake of the terrorist
incidents in France in 2015 and 2016, and then backed
down in the midst of significant public outcry (CBC
News 2016). In Canada, the Conservative Government
adopted a revocation law in June 2015, which has been
overturned by the more recently elected Liberal Gov-
ernment. In Australia, legislation to permit the state
to revoke the citizenship of convicted terrorists passed
into law in 2015 (Thwaites 2015). To my knowledge,
among democratic states, the UK has the broadest of
denationalization laws, which permits denationalizing
even a single nationality citizen (and so permits making
someone stateless), if it can be shown that her contin-
ued possession of UK citizenship is not “conducive to
the public good” (Gibney 2013a, 650). Using this clause
of the UK denationalization law, as Home Secretary,
now-Prime Minister Theresa May proposed rescinding
the citizenship of dual-citizens convicted of child traf-
ficking (Parveen 2017), saying their continued presence
in the UK was “not conducive” to the public good.
One possible response to these laws is to acknowl-
edge their legitimacy, either in the face of the excep-
tional threats posed by terrorism, or as part of the long
tradition of political theory that has accepted the right
of states to banish citizens who are perceived as threats
(Gibney 2013b, 648–49). One might simply argue, fol-
lowing broadly in this tradition, that the creation of so-
ciety should be understood in contractual terms, where
any party who fails to carry out her part of the deal can
be expelled. A long history of US jurisprudence treated
treasonous crimes in specifically this way: those who
committed certain crimes were considered disloyal cit-
izens who, by their actions, had acted voluntarily to
terminate the contract which bound citizen and state
to each other (Weil 2012). Such individuals could, cor-
respondingly, be denationalized and expelled.
And yet, recent scholarly assessments of revocation
laws are cautious, recognizing that the costs of being de-
nationalized, to the individuals who lose the protective
status of citizenship, are very high. Correspondingly,
they warn against any defense that would permit states
to denationalize easily, or without respecting due pro-
cess, including the right to appeal denationalization
decisions. Nevertheless, they have tended to remain
within this broad political theoretic tradition, by leav-
ing at least some space for denationalization laws to
operate, at least in cases of egregious harm, under a
narrow set of circumstances.
Christian Barry and Luara Ferracioli, for example,
propose that where an individual commits a severe
crime against a state, of a political nature, where she
has been aided by a second state in which she pos-
sesses citizenship, and which can be expected to pro-
tect at least her basic rights, she may be denational-
ized and deported to that state (Barry and Ferracioli
2016). Similarly, Rainer Bauböck and Vesco Paskalev
argue for what they term a “genuine links” view, ac-
cording to which when there is evidence that, by their
wrongdoings, citizens intend to sever links to the state
and the citizens it represents, they are justly liable to
denationalization (Bauböck and Paskalev 2015). Shai
Lavi defends a “civic allegiance” view, according to
which certain crimes can be understood as attempts
to undermine the capacity of a state to self-govern,
and thus their perpetrators can be legitimately dena-
tionalized (Lavi 2010); in a short piece, David Miller
concurs with this general view, drawing on the Ancient
Athenian practice of ostracism, namely, that where
certain actions threaten to undermine the stability of
a democracy, those who perpetrate them can be le-
gitimately subject to denationalization (Miller 2016).
These attempts draw resources from a range of political
theoretic traditions, but share the general thought that,
although limited, there are cases where denationaliza-
tion can be permissibly imposed on wrongdoers.
There are two significant exceptions to this trend.
Mathew Gibney has argued that denationalization vi-
olates principles that are at the heart of liberal democ-
racy. For one thing, denationalization that permits
statelessness is “unjust and cruel” (Gibney 2013b, 651).
For another, denationalization laws that target only
dual citizens (who would not be made stateless by
losing one of their citizenships) violate the egalitari-
anism to which democracies must be committed, and is
thereby invidious (Ibid., 652). And finally, the imposi-
tion of denationalization is too often arbitrary in how
it is applied or in its effects (Ibid.). Similarly, elsewhere
I have argued that the defenses offered for denation-
alization do not meet democratic standards of justifi-
cation, and that correspondingly denationalization is
undemocratic (Lenard 2016a, 2016b).
What is absent from prior discussions of denational-
ization, however, is any account of what kind of right
the right to citizenship is, and what it is intended to pro-
tect. In this article, my objective is to argue that a proper
understanding of the foundations of the right to citi-
zenship shows why citizens should be protected from
denationalization. Doing so is challenging, however;
as Linda Bosniak observes, while there is widespread
agreement among political theorists that citizenship
should be seen as “embodying the highest normative
value,” it is a striking fact about the political theory
of basic and human rights that whether the right to
citizenship is among them is rarely raised (Bosniak
2000, 451). There is ongoing deliberation focused on
which rights are attached to the status of citizen—the
most frequently cited is the right to vote—and are
therefore “membership rights” and which rights are
attached to individuals in virtue of their humanity, and
are therefore “human rights” or “basic rights”—for
example, the right to bodily integrity or the right to
be free from slavery. But, where the right to citizen-
ship itself should be situated, and why it might belong
(or not) on a short, or even a more expansive, list of
basic or human rights, has not been adequately elabo-




























































































































revocable, unliterally, by states, or whether it should be
treated as forfeitable by one’s actions, as many other
human rights are, is underexplored. In my view, the
challenge of properly situating the right to citizenship
stems from its domestic and international dimensions;
these dimensions rest on different foundations, which
need to be carefully distinguished.
THE RIGHT TO CITIZENSHIP:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
DIMENSIONS
The suggestion that the right to citizenship should be
treated as a basic human right can be traced back
to Hannah Arendt’s important work. Across multiple
texts, she observes that the murderous strategy pur-
sued by the Nazis began slowly, by first demoting Jews
to second-class citizens in Germany (for example, by
denying them the right to hold certain jobs), and then
by denationalizing them. In her analysis, the murder of
Jews was made easier by their having been made state-
less first, as a result of which they were formally denied
the protection that citizenship could and should offer.
(Arendt 1963). In a well-known passage, Arendt writes,
if a human being loses his political status, he should, ac-
cording to the implications of the inborn and inalienable
rights of man, come under exactly the situation for which
the declarations of such general rights provided. Actually
the opposite is the case. It seems that a man who is nothing
but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible
for other people to treat him as a fellow-man (Arendt 1973,
300).
From this historical experience, Arendt proposes, we
must understand citizenship as the “right to have
rights,” because without a state designated to protect
an individual’s rights, she is vulnerable to abuse from
which she has no way to protect herself.
Responding to the same set of prompts that
motivated Arendt’s pleas, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights acknowledges the “right to nationality”
as among the basic set of rights deserving of
protection. As a matter of political theory, citizenship
and nationality are of course distinct phenomena;
however, for the purposes of this article, I take the
“right to nationality” that is protected in international
law to be equivalent to the right to citizenship to which
I refer throughout this article. The Declaration reads as
follows: “1) Everyone has the right to a nationality, and
2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality
nor denied the right to change his nationality.” The
Universal Declaration thereby directs us, as a matter
of international law, to acknowledge that individuals
have a basic, human, right to citizenship status. The
justifications offered in favor of recognizing this right
as a basic human right are distinctly normative in
content: in designating the right to nationality a human
right, the framers of the Universal Declaration were
targeting statelessness and its many and varied harms.
As Mathew Gibney explains, to impose statelessness
on an individual (or to permit someone to remain
stateless), is to subject them to cruelty, because
it is “a recipe for exclusion, precariousness and
general dispossession” (Gibney 2013b, 651). Just as
Arendt noticed in the case of denationalized Jews in
Nazi Germany, stateless individuals are particularly
vulnerable to rights abuses, by state and nonstate
agents, since they have no clear entity from which they
can demand recourse for rights violations (Bloom,
Tonkiss, and Cole 2017; Gibney 2013b). Yet, as many
observers have recognized, the obligations imposed by
the international right to citizenship are limited. The
international order is simply responsible (in the ideal)
to ensure that all individuals have access to a citizen-
ship, not any particular one (Howard-Hassman 2015;
Edwards 2016). Access to citizenship somewhere, as it
is protected in international law, is a basic human right,
but it is not all that is meant by the right to citizenship.
If the grounding of the international right to citizen-
ship is in protecting individuals from harm, what is the
grounding of the domestic right to citizenship? Tradi-
tionally, domestically, citizenship is thought to guaran-
tee three rights—the right to vote, the right to hold a
passport (and associated travel rights), and residential
security. In my view, residential security should be un-
derstood as prior to the others and is therefore best
understood as the foundation of the right of citizen-
ship. To see the plausibility of this ordering, imagine
a state granting the right to vote or issuing a pass-
port to someone who has been exiled (permanently)
from that state.5 It would be unthinkable for a state
to permit an exiled individual—a person who was no
longer permitted to reside in that state—to vote or to
travel with its protection. So, the right to citizenship is
grounded first and foremost in the fundamental interest
individuals have in possessing security of residence.6
It protects the confident expectation that individuals
will be able to continue living where they are for the
foreseeable future and permits them to make decisions
about how their lives will go (Angeli 2016).7 The impor-
tance that should be placed on confident expectation of
5 In fact, to be slightly more specific, I have elsewhere argued that
the right to vote is not a right of citizenship, but instead should
be available to all long-term residents, whether citizen or not. See
Lenard (2012, 2016).
6 I am relying on Joseph Raz’ interests-based account of rights (Raz
1984). On this general view, very strong interests that individuals
possess serve to ground a right and correspondingly duties on others
to respect it.
7 This way of thinking about the right to citizenship relies evidently
on Joseph Carens’ important work on the moral right of irregular
migrants to remain in their states of residence; in his view, their
long-term residence grounds their right to gain citizenship (or at
least regularized) status, even where their initial entrance to a state,
or their continued presence in a state, is technically in violation of
immigration law (Carens 2010, 2015). In my view, Carens draws too
heavily on the notion that the right to stay for irregular migrants
stems from the connections that they make over time; this appears
to leave irregular migrants who form inadequate connections at risk
of removal and it appears to render irregular migrants subject to
subjective evaluation of the quality of their connections by others. It
is better, I have argued elsewhere, to simply rely on residence in the
case of irregular migrants as underpinning the right to citizenship. In
making this argument, I could appear to be side-stepping the compli-
cated questions of whether there are normative differences between



























































































































Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization
residential security is echoed by political theorists of
territory, who observe that “individuals make choices
and develop aims and activities on the assumption that
they live in a place” (Moore 2015, 38) or that the right
of individuals to occupy territory confers “secure rights
of use and access to a particular geographic space,”
which are “of central importance for an individual’s
life-plans and projects” (Stilz 2013, 334). The duty that
corresponds to this right is the duty to refrain from
undermining a citizen’s confident expectation in her
ability to stay where she is.8
Let me make two additional observations about the
importance of security of residence and the corre-
sponding duty on the part of the state to protect it. First,
the interests we have in staying are typically best under-
stood as interests in staying within a particular state’s
territorial boundaries, rather than anywhere within
that state. I am not claiming that the state (necessarily)
possesses a duty to protect an individual’s ability to stay
in a home if she is not able to pay her mortgage, nor am
I aiming to deny (necessarily) the right of a landlord
to evict nonpaying (or otherwise problematic) tenants;
in a market economy, in which the sale and rental of
homes and apartments are matters of private contracts
between individuals, the state is not (necessarily) im-
plicated in protecting the right to stay in a particular
abode. Having said that, note that states regularly take
a strong interest in security of residence even in these
circumstances, for example by limiting the conditions
under which evictions from privately owned and rented
property are possible.9 Second, it is of course true that
the state is deeply implicated in where citizens choose
to live, and regularly adopts policies that encourage or
discourage the movement of citizens from one place
of residence to another; the Canadian government
recently offered residents of small and hard-to-reach
communities in Newfoundland, which it is obliged to
service at considerable state expense, the opportunity
to abandon their communities in exchange for large
sums of money (CBC News 2013).
DEFINING DENATIONALIZATION
In what follows, I define denationalization as follows:
The unilateral, forced or effectively forced, deprivation of
the status of citizen from an individual, who has at any time
legitimately held the status of citizen.10
general view that long-term residence does in fact generate expecta-
tions of residential security; but, for reasons of space, I cannot spell
out the details of this view, here, and have chosen to focus simply
on individuals who already possess the status of citizen. See Lenard
(2015b).
8 This is certainly subject to a prior assumption that the citizen (and
its corresponding state) is legitimately entitled to be on the territory
in question. A citizen of a state that is illegitimately occupying ter-
ritory does not necessarily have a right to the confident expectation
that she can stay where she is.
9 For more on why the move to treat access to permanent shelter as
an essential precondition for being entitled to the equal protection
of citizenship rights in a democratic state is morally problematic, see
Feldman (2006).
10 This slightly awkward phrasing is intended to leave open the pos-
sibility that people who have acquired citizenship fraudulently can
be denationalized.
On this understanding, denationalization transpires in
both of the following cases: (1) unilaterally, where the
state determines that an individual should be denation-
alized, and (2) effectively unilaterally, where a state
strongly pressures an individual to renounce citizen-
ship, in such a way that no person faced with the rele-
vant choices could reasonably be predicted to resist so-
called “voluntary” renunciation. The former captures
the standard cases of denationalization. The latter cap-
tures cases in which wrongdoers are given the option to
accept denationalization in exchange for significantly
reduced punishment (typically in the form of signifi-
cantly reduced incarceration time). The most famous
example of the latter is perhaps the case of Yaser Esam
Hamdi, who was accused of fighting for the Taliban in
Afghanistan against the US, and detained as an “enemy
combatant” at Guantanamo Bay. While there, he was
discovered to have been born in the US, and so (be-
cause the United States practices birthright citizenship)
American. He was then told that, if he renounced his
American citizenship, he would be freed from Guan-
tanamo Bay and deported to Saudi Arabia where he
had been raised and where he was also a citizen.11
Notice that the definition above does not make ex-
plicit reference to the deportation that would ordinarily
follow denationalization. Indeed, it is nearly always the
case that deportation from territory follows denation-
alization.12 But the two are not essentially connected;
it is possible, both in principle and in practice, to distin-
guish between denationalization from citizenship sta-
tus and deportation from territory. In particular, there
are cases—though not many—where states choose to
withdraw citizenship status from an individual who
cannot be deported. One reason is that, although an
individual does possess a second citizenship, it is citi-
zenship in a state that practices torture; international
law forbids deporting individuals to states in which they
may face state-sanctioned torture.13 A second reason
is that although the denationalizing state has reason
to believe that an individual possesses a second citi-
zenship, and so is, in principle, deportable to that state
in case of denationalization, that second state refuses
to recognize the individual’s status; as a result, the in-
dividual cannot be deported. A third reason is that
some states (for example, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
and many other European states) reserve the right to
withdraw citizenship, even in cases where individuals
do not possess a second citizenship (not even one that
is in dispute, in other words) and will thereby become
stateless (de Groot and Vink 2010, 14). In this case,
an individual is not eligible for deportation, and will
be forced to reside permanently (and paradoxically)
within the state’s territorial jurisdiction, since without
citizenship one cannot obtain the travel documents
11 For more on this case, see Nyers (2006).
12 There is another situation of course, which is where denational-
ization from status is enacted while a citizen is abroad.
13 More generally stated, states may believe that there are additional
mitigating circumstances that tell against deporting someone whose
citizenship status has been withdrawn. One can imagine permitting
a parent to continue to reside with her citizen-children, even after




























































































































needed to enter another country (Lenard 2015a). In
what follows, unless I state otherwise, I assume depor-
tation follows denationalization.
ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND A STATE’S RIGHT
TO DENATIONALIZE
There are two clusters of defenses offered in favor
of the right of states to denationalize. One set be-
gins by stating the priority of democratic principles
and suggests roughly that, where denationalization is
protecting democracy or is an expression of demo-
cratic principles, it can be justified. In principle, these
defenses allow for the imposition of statelessness on
single-nationality citizens. A second set begins by ob-
serving the privilege associated with dual citizenship,
and argues that, since statelessness is not the result of
rescinding (one) citizenship in the case of dual citizens,
the revocation of (one) citizenship is permissible. Each
of these clusters of arguments has multiple variants;
in the following two sections, I will examine them and
argue that none is persuasive.
1) Denationalization protects democracy
One defense of the right to revoke hooks it to the
importance of physical safety in democratic states. A
defining feature of a legitimate and sovereign state
is its willingness and ability to protect the safety of
all citizens; this understanding of a sovereign state’s
key obligation goes back at least to Thomas Hobbes’
explanation for why individuals cede authority to a
Leviathan, that is, why they trade physical insecurity
for the protection he offers. If this is correct, then an
individual who by her actions aims to threaten this
physical safety, by engaging in crimes that threaten a
state’s security must be stopped and also prevented
from doing so again in the future; one way to ensure
this is to denationalize her.
This is more generally the claim made in contem-
porary discourse on revocation: the state has one cen-
tral responsibility, to protect its national security, one
aspect of which is to protect its citizens from grievous
harms, including those caused by terrorism. Many polit-
ical actors propose that terrorism poses unique threats
to the physical safety of citizens. They tell us, we are
in a state of “exception” or “emergency,” where civil
rights can be sacrificed in exchange for ensuring secu-
rity (for a discussion, see the contributions to Ramraj
et al. 2005). Or, put differently, under conditions of
exceptional risks posed to citizens, states can reason-
ably claim that their sovereignty rights should trump
the rights of citizens (Davis and Silver 2004; Joyner
2004; Golder and Williams 2006). This is precisely what
UK Prime Minister Theresa May said in the wake of
recent terrorist attacks, when she declared that she
would not permit human rights legislation to restrain
her terrorism-fighting strategies: “if human rights laws
stop us from doing it, we will change those laws so we
can do it” (Mason and Dodd 2017). Correspondingly,
under these exceptional conditions, it is reasonable to
accept that normally unjust punishments can be justifi-
ably deployed.
Even granting the possibility that there is something
uniquely dangerous about the terrorist threats many
democratic states face, in the case of punishments as
severe as denationalization, however, it seems reason-
able to demand evidence of its contribution to pro-
tecting safety as a condition of its use. Yet, there is
no clear evidence that this particular power serves to
make democratic states safer (Lenard 2016a). Citizens
and outsiders perpetuate acts of terrorism in states
that have long had revocation laws on the books, in
states that have recently passed revocation laws, and
in states that have rejected revocation laws. More im-
portantly, every democratic state possesses a robust
criminal justice system through which crimes against
the state can be effectively prosecuted. No defender of
the right to revoke has provided reasons for believing
that the existing suite of criminal powers in demo-
cratic states is inadequate to deal with the kinds of
crimes that might, otherwise, trigger the revocation of
citizenship. In particular, democratic states regularly
incarcerate dangerous offenders, and while there are
certainly many difficult moral questions to be asked
about the appropriate use of jails and prisons, and the
conditions under which inmates live, there is no clear
reason to believe that the physical safety of citizens is
protected better by expelling wrongdoers than it is by
incarcerating them.
A variation on this protective argument draws heav-
ily on the Ancient Athenian practice of ostracism I
described earlier (Forsdyke 2009). This practice, which
appears to have much in common with contemporary
revocation laws, permitted Athenians to vote to expel
citizens who had gained power—by amassing wealth
for example or popularity—of a kind that threatened
to undermine democratic practice in Athens. The ex-
clusion from Athens was temporary—for ten years
only—and was not accompanied by a loss of property
or citizenship; after ten years, ostracized individuals
were permitted to return to their untouched property,
and the rights that citizenship in Athens entailed, but
(ideally) with much reduced influence over democratic
political life.
The thought that individuals threaten to undermine
the practice of democracy in contemporary democra-
cies is uncompelling, however. Whereas the founda-
tions of democracy in Ancient Athens may have been
unstable, the same is not the case in contemporary
democratic states. The practice of ostracism may have
served to protect Athenian democratic institutions, as
David Miller notes in a recent article (Miller 2016);
although it is surely right, as Miller claims, that the
stability of democratic states should not be taken for
granted, it is hard to believe that the power to denation-
alize individuals is in any significant way related to the
ability of contemporary democracies to protect their
ability to function. The dis-analogy continues: those
who were targeted by ostracism in Ancient Athens
were the most powerful, whereas those who are at
risk of being targeted by revocation laws are presently



























































































































Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization
that those most likely to be targeted by revocation pro-
ceedings are disproportionately Muslim citizens; rather
than offer protection to citizens in democratic states,
there is considerable risk that such laws will instead be
used to further victimize already vulnerable citizens.14
The claim that the practice of democracy requires ex-
pelling individuals who will otherwise undermine its
foundations is implausible.
A slightly different way of defending revocation sug-
gests its purpose lies in its expressive role (Hampton
1992). A democratic state typically relies on the fact
that individuals have internalized its norms, and thus
do not require costly and physical coercion in order
to abide by them. One way that a democratic state
communicates these norms is by delineating a range
of unacceptable behaviors and their associated punish-
ments. From the point of view of an expressivist theory
of punishment, revocation may appear to be, logically
and symbolically, the right punishment for certain cat-
egories of crimes, in particular, crimes which states un-
derstand as an attack on their foundations. This kind
of defense does not risk being rejected for inadequate
evidence that it is in fact the case that the crime un-
dermines democratic stability. Rather, it is simply that
any individual who has by her actions attempted to rob
her fellow citizens of the benefits of living under demo-
cratic rule, by attempting to undermine the foundations
for the effective function of democratic institutions,
deserves to have their status rescinded, that is, to be
denied the very rights and benefits she has attempted
to deny to others. Ultimately, denationalization is a way
of reasserting the importance of democratic values, and
is thereby a fitting response to certain crimes.
But we should resist this sort of fittingness argument
for several reasons. First, the practice of incarcerat-
ing those who harm, or aim to undermine, democratic
institutions, appears to be fitting in much the same
way as denationalization. In both cases, the purpose
is to separate the criminal from society and thereby
to reduce her access to a large list of basic freedoms
that law-abiding individuals can take for granted, and
in so doing, to signal that she is to be treated as a
kind of partial or conditional citizen (Vaughan 2000).
To the extent that it makes sense to treat criminals as
individuals who have violated the terms of the social
contract that ought to bind citizens in a law-abiding
state, the criminal is forced by both incarceration and
denationalization to confront her failure to have lived
up to the terms of the agreement.
Yet, there are reasons to believe that incarceration
rather than denationalization is a more appropriate
punishment, in the sense of more consistent with a
range of democratic values. First, incarceration permits
the harmed democratic community the knowledge that
it is issuing punishment and ensuring that it is exacted.
The state that has been harmed returns the harm, as
it were, by constraining a criminal’s freedom, perhaps
14 The worry that revocation laws will target members of the commu-
nity is, indeed, expressed by Muslim citizens in states that are newly
implementing or reinvigorating revocation laws. See, for example,
Vucetic et al. (2016).
forever. The criminal’s ability to inflict additional harm
is removed (they are prevented from perpetrating fu-
ture harm, at least during the period of incarceration).
The epistemic advantage of incarceration over dena-
tionalization is considerable; while democratic states
can incarcerate wrongdoers, and thereby know with
certainty that the appropriate punishment has been
carried out and that the wrongdoer is prevented from
carrying out further harm, denationalization can carry
with it a range of uncertainties, including whether the
state to which the criminal is subsequently deported
will prove willing and able to ensure that appropriate
punishment (or surveillance) is carried out, so that she
cannot commit further harm.
Second, it is worth noting that among theorists of
punishment, there is considerable disagreement about
the purpose of punishing wrongdoers, and to the ex-
tent that finding the fitting punishment as I described
above is an objective, it is only one of many. Another
is articulated in a recent article by Elizabeth Cohen,
in which she argues that part of what makes a pun-
ishment appropriate for democracies is that those who
are punished are treated as capable of moral reform,
and therefore as people who can return to the ranks of
full and participating citizens in their own state (Co-
hen 2016). Denationalization denies opportunities for
reform and is therefore an unacceptable punishment
in a democratic state.
Third, there is a widespread belief that criminals
should face trials, and be punished, in the communi-
ties where they have committed the crime. The general
reasoning here is that a political community has a right
to exact punishment on individuals who have done it
harm; the crime is considered to be against a particular
community (Duff 2001). This thought runs through dis-
cussions of the appropriate locations for trials, domes-
tically and internationally. Domestically, it is common
practice to hold the trial in the jurisdiction in which a
crime was committed; where there are deviations from
this practice, and they are rare, it is normally because
there is some belief that a local trial will not be fair.
The argument for holding the trial—and subsequent
punishment—in the jurisdiction in which the crime was
committed is that the harm was done to a particular
community, which is entitled to witness the pursuit of
justice on its own behalf. This in part also explains
the general view that when an individual engages in
a criminal act outside of her territory of citizenship,
she should face punishment in that jurisdiction—she
should face those she has harmed—rather than her
own jurisdiction.15 The underlying logic is that the re-
lations requiring reparation are between a community
and a criminal who harmed a particular community.
Note that the language here is of reparation, that is, it
is language that assumes, as above, that rehabilitation
15 This belief also underpins the motivation for extradition treaties;
states should be willing to return, in some cases forcibly, criminals
who entered their jurisdiction for the purposes of avoiding pros-
ecution and punishment elsewhere. This is tricky, though. There
are times when there is a widespread belief that someone who has
committed a crime should nevertheless not be extradited; Edward




























































































































of the criminal into the status of a law-respecting citizen
is the goal, or at least a genuine possibility. Denational-
ization denies the criminal and the community she has
harmed the opportunity for all stages of reparation.
One possible response to this set of objections to
denationalization is this: the account just above as-
sumed that one or both parties wants the relation to
be repaired. But that may be true, in fact, of neither
party. What if the criminal prefers denationalization
over incarceration, or possibly even intends to sever
connections with her state of citizenship by committing
grievous crimes? Would that preference for denational-
ization justify it? One might think that the preferences
of the criminal ought not to be respected since, after
all, she is a criminal. But this is mistaken. For example,
it is permissible, and perhaps even morally required, to
consider the preference a criminal has for the location
of her incarceration; for example, she may prefer to be
incarcerated as close to her family as possible, and this
can be justly considered a relevant preference. And
yet even if one believes that criminals’ preferences for
the conditions of her incarceration should be respected
in some cases, it seems reasonable to deprioritize (at
least some of) them where the crimes are grievous and
aimed at undermining the foundations of democracy.
In particular, it seems morally relevant that the reason
for the preference is, at least in part, to trade a more
burdensome punishment (in this case, incarceration) in
favor of one that is less burdensome (possible freedom,
elsewhere). Any criminal can presumably be expected
to prefer a lesser sentence. But that preference appears
morally unrelated to the question of what is a fair and
just sentence; it is therefore, when offered as part of an
apparent reduction in sentence, to be understood as co-
erced denationalization (as in the case of Hamdi, which
I noted earlier), and thereby unjustifiable because the
conditions of consent are not present.
Perhaps though the wrongdoer aims to signal—
exactly as the defenders of revocation posit—that she
is no longer loyal to her state of citizenship, that she no
longer respects the norms and values that underpin the
institutions that govern the relevant political commu-
nity and indeed, that she means by her actions to sever
the relations between herself and her co-citizens. Cit-
izens are already permitted to sever citizenship bonds
on a voluntary basis, if they so choose.16 Wouldn’t it
then be consistent to argue that a wrongdoer’s prefer-
ence for denationalization is adequate to justify it, since
it should count as an instance of the right that citizens
possess, as a matter of international law, to renounce
citizenship?
Although there is considerable plausibility to this
view, I do not believe so. Here, the danger of a slippery
slope is too high: accepting that some actions count
as evidence of voluntary renunciation puts judges (or
other similar figures) in the position of interpreting
behaviors as evidence of attitudes in ways that lend
16 Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights notes, no
state is permitted to refuse the right of a citizen to abandon her
nationality (except, in some cases, where doing so would result in
statelessness), if she wishes to do so.
themselves towards dangerous overreach. This view—
that there is potential for dangerous overreach—finds
expression in a key American Supreme Court ruling
(Afroyim v Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)). In this decision,
which itself overruled decades of jurisprudence that
had treated certain actions by citizens as equivalent to
their renouncing citizenship, the Court argued that the
state could not reliably interpret certain behaviors, by
citizens, as evidence of a desire to renounce citizenship.
As a result, the revocation of citizenship in the United
States was rendered unconstitutional (except in cases
of fraud) (Weil 2012, 175; Spiro 2014). The only act that
can and should be interpreted as a desire to renounce
citizenship is a formal renunciation, made under con-
ditions of consent.
What if the denationalizing community would pre-
fer not to repair relations with the wrongdoer? Aren’t
these preferences morally relevant, given that they are
those expressed by the democratic majority, which is
the aggrieved party? Again, in my view, they are not.
It is worth repeating the democratic political commu-
nity’s obligation to treat a wrongdoer as though she
can be rehabilitated. The political community is bound
by a public culture that is or should be defined by
a set of shared norms and values. The deliberations
that determine the content of these norms and values
must be open to all citizens if, indeed, the culture is
to be understood as adequately public. The ways in
which these norms and values are imparted to citizens
are multiple; some formal and others less so. But it
is fair to say, in broad terms, that one responsibility
a political community—that is, a political community
that is bound by a shared public culture—possesses
is the responsibility to ensure that the shared norms
and values are imparted to all members of the commu-
nity, coupled with the requirement that the venue in
which its content is deliberated is adequately open and
inclusive.17 Where it fails to impart these values and
norms adequately, it must take responsibility for this
failure. When citizens act in ways that are taken to be
demonstrating disloyalty or as failure to have internal-
ized the shared norms and values of the community,
and who thereby act to undermine the foundations
on which the political community is based, the polit-
ical community may properly be understood as having
failed its citizens, both those who are harmed as well
as the criminal herself.18 This responsibility requires
taking charge of punishing the wrongdoer, within the
boundaries in which the crime was committed; dena-
tionalization amounts to an unwillingness to take re-
sponsibility for its failure to successfully educate its
citizens and for punishing them appropriately.
17 There is obviously much to be said on what counts as “adequate”
from the perspective of being open and inclusive.
18 I say “may be responsible” rather than “certainly responsible”
deliberately, because there are, of course, cases in which democratic
states pursue and protect unjust laws, and it would evidently be
problematic to claim that where citizens protest these laws, the
moral problem is that states have failed to adequately impart unjust
norms to citizens. The point is simply a general one, which is that a
generally just state is responsible for inculcating a commitment to



























































































































Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization
One might propose that a state does not possess this
responsibility in the case of immigrants, in which their
formative years were spent elsewhere (Miller 2016).
But, that proposal is mistaken—as in the case of more
generally imparting norms and values to citizens born
on a territory bound by a particular public culture, the
process of immigration and naturalization to citizen-
ship places a responsibility on the state for educating
newcomers to citizenship, that is, into this public cul-
ture. To the extent that the relation between immi-
grants and the state they join is properly understood as
a contract, the state takes on responsibility for provid-
ing the conditions under which the successful integra-
tion of immigrants—to the social, economic, and po-
litical communities they have joined—is possible and,
indeed, likely. Where it fails to impart these norms and
values, it again must take responsibility for its failures,19
in the form of punishing citizens in such a way that they
retain—perhaps in the far distant future—the oppor-
tunity to repair the relations they have damaged, and
to return to the political community as full and equal
members of society.20
2) Dual nationality is a privilege
In the discussion above about whether denationaliza-
tion is compatible with democratic principle, I made
only brief mention of a key element of many contem-
porary discussions of denationalization, which I will
now highlight. This is that, in many states that permit
revocation, it is permitted only if individuals would not
thereby become stateless; as a result, only dual nation-
als are affected by revocation of citizenship laws. So
long as the revocation law is written and implemented
so as to make it impossible to render an individual
stateless, say some of its defenders, revocation can
permissibly be imposed on dual nationals who have
committed or intend to commit grievous crimes (de
Groot and Vink 2010). This argument is pressed in a
variety of ways, and I shall refute them all.
To begin, it is worth noting that all of the follow-
ing justifications for denationalization in cases of dual
citizenship rely explicitly or implicitly on the notion
that there is an unfairness of some kind generated by
the fact of dual nationality (Herzog 2010). One might
simply deny that there is something unfair about dual
nationality in the first place. Nationality may simply
belong on the list of so-called morally arbitrary fac-
tors about an individual, including race, sex, gender,
religion and so on, that should not have any impact
on how one is treated by the social and political insti-
tutions that govern a state. This would be consistent
with global trends towards recognizing the legitimacy
19 There is evidently a deep complication here, reflected in the more
general literature on policies that have been deployed by ostensibly
democratic states to segregate and marginalize minority and immi-
grant communities. In these cases, it would not be surprising if these
communities reject rather than internalize the dominant norms of
the larger community. I leave this aside for now.
20 Note that this same reasoning makes life sentences without parole
and the death penalty unjustified, for assuming that rehabilitation is
not possible.
of dual citizenship, a shift which generally reflects an
abandonment of the view that loyalty to a state is indi-
visible and that, correspondingly, dual citizens cannot
be trusted to demonstrate adequate loyalty (Bauböck
2007; Bloemraad 2004). An accompanying thought is
that, even if there are cases where dual nationals are
significantly more loyal to one state than another, there
are enough dual nationals for whom their status in both
states is meaningful; correspondingly, even in cases
where dual nationals generally reside in one state (as
inevitably they will), it is a mistake to infer that their
connection to a second state is insignificant. If these un-
derpinning thoughts are genuine, they rule out treating
the citizenship of dual citizens differently, by permitting
its revocation as punishment for, or to deter, crimes.
Defending revocation policies requires asserting that
the citizenship of dual citizens is less robust than that of
single-nationality citizens. One might therefore reject
any claim that dual nationality is unfair, by responding
that any differential treatment of the citizenship sta-
tus of some individuals is a violation of the equality
that citizenship is intended to protect in democratic
states.
But, since some believe that dual nationality is a
source of inequality, it is worth fleshing out the ways
in which the objection—that it is acceptable to subject
only dual nationals to the threat of denationalization—
is presented, so that I can be more specific about why
these attempted defenses of revocation ultimately fail.
One thought is that the possession of two nation-
alities is a kind of privilege that confers a significant
advantage, which violates the foundational equality on
which democratic states rely. It is not that dual na-
tionality is impossible to come by—there are many
cases where individuals choose to migrate and then
to naturalize into a second nationality, which though
time-consuming is within the realm of possibility. But,
doing so is cumbersome enough that those who already
possess these two nationalities can legitimately be un-
derstood to be advantaged. These advantages mainly
consist in a larger pool of convenient travel, work, ed-
ucational and residence opportunities; as a result, dual
nationality violates equality and making dual nation-
als liable to denationalization is a permissible way in
which to reestablish equality between single and dual
nationality citizens.21
It is, of course, a basic principle of egalitarian po-
litical theory that, where differences among citizens
generate inequalities, they should be remedied as far
as possible. Much hinges on what the relevant metric of
inequality is thought to be—if the focus is on material
inequalities, then it is typical to permit and encourage
the redistribution of wealth. If the focus is on welfare
inequality, then emphasis is given to protecting the
equal access to welfare for all citizens. If the focus is on
political equality, then emphasis is given to eliminating
inequalities that threaten to disrupt citizens’ ideally
equal capacity to influence political decision making.
21 I would specifically like to thank Zofia Stemplowska for many
discussions about how different conceptions of equality might treat




























































































































The point is that where we have identified a preferred
metric (or metrics) of equality in a political state, ben-
efits (and burdens) are unjust where they disrupt that
form of equality, and compensation can legitimately
be demanded of those who benefit by those who are
burdened. So, one question we might reasonably ask
is whether the possession, by some citizens, of dual
nationality is such that it disrupts a relevant form of
equality.
One preliminary challenge that must be faced in
responding to this question is how to measure the
advantages of possessing multiple citizenships. If one
believed that dual nationality was an inequality that
demanded compensation because of the unearned ben-
efits it offers to those who hold it, one would also have
to acknowledge that some citizenships, as a matter
of practice, offer greater benefits than do others. At
present, US citizens can travel to 174 countries without
procuring additional visas; Somali citizens can travel
to only 31. Similarly, the number of opportunities that
accompany living in the United States, and the quality
of rights protection, are significantly greater than those
that accompany living in Somalia. Thus, a state consid-
ering the value of the benefits offered by a particular
second citizenship will surely have to consider that the
benefits of some second citizenships are insignificant
compared to the benefits of others. Correspondingly,
revoking some citizenships is costlier than revoking
others.
Complicating this accounting further is the question
of whether a person should be penalized for having a
second citizenship when the second country does not
permit renunciation of citizenship. Many defenders of
denationalization propose that such individuals should
be exempt from denationalization policies. This will-
ingness to exempt stems from the thought that those
who would genuinely like to protect themselves from
the risk of expulsion can do so “easily,” by renouncing
the second citizenship. If this severance is impossible,
then we cannot hold dual citizens responsible for their
failure to hold only a single citizenship status. Yet, if
one truly believes that benefits—even those that are
unasked for, and which one cannot refuse—require
compensation, one must also believe that the benefits
associated with an unrenounceable second citizenship
require compensation from its holder. Even if it cannot
be abandoned, a second citizenship will still provide at
least some greater opportunities to travel and reside
abroad, and these require compensation in some form.
Finally, any state engaging in the process of develop-
ing a schema to articulate the precise compensation
for holding a second citizenship will have to confront
that some states also impose costs on their citizens,
regardless of whether they are residents. These costs
include, mainly, national service requirements and tax
burdens, and surely would have to be balanced against
the residence and travel benefits provided by the sec-
ond citizenship.
Let’s say, though, that all of these measurement and
balancing challenges were successfully meetable and
met. What, then, is reasonable compensation for the
possession of dual citizenship and its attendant bene-
fits? Is liability to denationalization a reasonable com-
pensation? To answer this question, it is worth noticing
two things. First, to the extent that dual nationality
does confer genuine advantages, these are advantages
that do not in most cases bear directly on the internal
material and political relations of a state.22 As citizens
interact with each other in political and social environ-
ments, whether some possess an additional citizenship
is generally irrelevant.
Second and more importantly, recall that the essen-
tial protection offered by citizenship status is residen-
tial security. Generally, we can see that even where
we believe that benefits for some small proportion of
citizens generate an inequality, and where we believe
that compensation is thereby due to fellow members
of the state, this compensation must be reasonable in
the sense that it returns the internal state of affairs
to equality as much as possible. However, since as
I said above, the benefits (though real) are minimal
from the perspective of internal, political relations, it
is not legitimate to demand that dual nationals com-
pensate in the form of accepting weakened protec-
tion for a basic right. Notice, furthermore, that one
possible response—dual-nationals can escape dena-
tionalization simply by refraining from engaging in
heinous crimes—is unacceptable; it would be similarly
unacceptable to adopt a law imposing greater crim-
inal penalties on residents of the east side of a city
than those on the west side, with the justification that
east-siders can avoid these penalties by refraining from
crime. The mere fact of having one subgroup liable to
denationalization undermines residential security.
A defender of revocation might insist, nevertheless,
that the small chance that dual nationals have of be-
ing subject to denationalization is justifiable for this
reason: even if we make their status very slightly less
secure in one state, they retain citizenship status else-
where. Dual citizens are not at risk of statelessness,
which is the grievous harm that must be avoided at
all costs. Thus, we might believe, the reduction in se-
curity offered to dual citizens in state X is more than
compensated for by the additional security provided
by their citizenship in state Y. Although this argument
satisfies the requirements imposed by the international
dimension of citizenship, it falls afoul of the domestic
dimension of citizenship, namely, its grounding in the
strong interests citizens have in residential security
here.
To remind, residential security permits the confident
expectation that one can continue to live here, and
make decisions about how one’s life should go. The
22 That said, it is possible to conceive cases where it might. Consider
for example a dual citizen of a repressive state and a democratic state,
who chooses to reside in the repressive state and militate for change
within it. This citizen has an “exit option” in case the repressive
state chooses to target her for persecution, and others (i.e., single
nationality citizens) do not. There is a genuine inequality between
citizens who do and do not have such an exit option. I thank Christine
Hobden for this example. It may also be possible, as some scholars
propose, that the opportunity to participate (in particular to vote) in
the political life of two states is a violation of democratic equality.



























































































































Democratic Citizenship and Denationalization
ways in which we interact—with political institutions,
with a cultural environment, with particular people in-
cluding family members and friends—are themselves
shaped by and dependent on being present, here, in
a particular political and cultural environment. Au-
tonomous lives are lived by individuals in particular
cultures (Kymlicka 1995). Some political theorists deny
the claim that any particular individual has a right to
live their lives in a particular and preferred cultural en-
vironment. To the extent that individuals require a cul-
tural environment in which to live autonomously, they
are entitled access to a cultural environment that can
offer the prerequisites for autonomous living. But indi-
viduals may not demand support to sustain a particular
and preferred culture, nor may they demand the right
to join a culture—citing a cultural preference—whose
members do not wish to include them. The right to
cultural or national self-determination, or the slightly
weaker right to access one’s own political or public
culture, is thereby denied on the grounds that while we
all have a right to self-determination, which is often
expressed in political forums, and while we all have
a right to live in the context of a flourishing culture,
we do not necessarily possess the right to do so in our
preferred political culture.
The same objection could well be raised here, that
is, that whereas individuals have a right to citizenship
they do not have a particular right to citizenship in the
state of their preference. This argument is what those
who would permit the expulsion of dual citizens are,
in effect, suggesting; no one can be denationalized if
they would thereby become stateless, but dual citizens
are not faced with statelessness, simply with being re-
quired to reside in, and accept state protection of their
rights from, their state of second citizenship, even while
preferring to reside in their state of first citizenship.
The objection might continue, their (domestic) right to
citizenship is not violated, because although they are
not necessarily entitled residential security in the state
of their preference, they are nevertheless guaranteed
residential security in a (human rights respecting) state.
Expressed in one way, this position is defensible. A
citizen of Norway who simply desires to migrate to
Canada and adopt Canadian citizenship, because she
prefers Tim Horton’s coffee and hockey (the central
aspects of Canadian culture), is not (necessarily) enti-
tled to do so simply because that is what she prefers.
Typically, although there are certainly important ex-
ceptions among open border advocates (Carens 1987;
Cole 2000), many scholars agree that states may, un-
der some conditions, legitimately exclude individuals
who are not yet on their territory, and who do not
yet hold citizenship in that state. In the case at issue
here, however, an individual already possesses the rel-
evant citizenship (i.e., they are not requesting access
to residence, they are already entitled to it), and those
who advocate the possible denationalization of citizens
deny that such an individual—even though she pos-
sesses citizenship in the state in question—is entitled to
keep that citizenship, and correspondingly to have her
residential security protected. That dual citizens have
an in-principle access residential security elsewhere is
inadequate—dual citizens are entitled to residential se-
curity in the state in which they reside, where they have
family and friends, and to whom they owe redress in
cases of violations (including grievous ones) of shared
norms and laws.
What about the state in which they do not normally
reside? Can that second citizenship be justifiably re-
voked in these cases? No. Here let me first remind
readers of my earlier observation about the nature of
dual citizenship and its growing acceptance. This accep-
tance depends on committing to the view that a dual
citizen can plausibly be loyal to two states at the same
time.
One might then press the point, further, with this
scenario: imagine a dual citizen, who was born in state
X, who has resided all her life in state X, whose sec-
ond citizenship (in Y) is an inheritance from a par-
ent. She has not visited state Y; is not familiar with
its language or culture; and has no friends or family
there. Now, imagine that this individual either com-
mits an (allegedly) denationalization-worthy crime in
X, or that she crosses very briefly into Y and commits
an (allegedly) denationalization-worthy crime there,
before returning to X. Surely, a critic might propose,
in this case, there is nothing problematic about state
Y revoking her citizenship; the relevant dual citizen,
by any measure, is simply not connected to state Y,
and so denationalization from this second citizenship
would constitute neither a great harm nor a significant
erosion of the personal relations that matter to them, in
particular, it does not appear to undermine her security
of residence in a problematic way. The critic might even
concede that it would be better if state Y chose against
denationalization (perhaps simply on the grounds that
it is better if states stay out of the business of assessing
the inner attitudes of citizens), but propose that it is
nevertheless permissible for a state to denationalize in
these admittedly limited and unlikely circumstances.
I understand why one might accept the permissibility
of revoking citizenship in these limited kinds of cases,
in which security of residence appears not to be threat-
ened by revocation. It should be clear, however, that I
aim to resist this conclusion. Rather, as I have argued,
citizenship status should be treated as permanent, that
is, irrevocable, even in the kinds of egregious cases
that have motivated recent attempts to reinvigorate
or adopt denationalization policies. This commitment
does not translate, however, into believing that all the
rights of citizenship are protected for nonresident dual
citizens.23 In other words, it is reasonable for states
in which citizens are nonresident to treat some sub-
set of rights as protected only for residents of that
state. Protecting a subset of rights for resident citizens
is a practice already in place in many states. Here is
one familiar example: citizens who reside outside of
a country for extended periods of time are normally
not permitted to access the full complement of social
services generally available to residents in the state
in which they do not reside. Similarly, in many states,





























































































































only resident citizens are permitted to vote. Citizens
who reside outside of the country for extended periods
of time can be denied the right to vote, while they are
residing abroad. In both cases—of voting and social
service provision—citizens retain the right to return
to reside in their country of citizenship, and then to
requalify for the associated rights and privileges once
they have remet the residence requirements. For these
policies to be justified, the residency period must be
short, but it is reasonable to impose one nevertheless.
The point of this discussion is simply to observe that
my defense of citizenship as permanently irrevocable
does not demand that states retain the obligation to
protect the full set of rights and privileges of citizen-
ship for nonresident citizens. It is reasonable to require
nonresident citizens, who return from abroad to reside,
to fulfill some obligations before their full set of citizen-
ship rights are returned to them. By their nature, dual-
nationals are nonresident citizens of at least one state.
Citizenship for nonresident citizens protects their right
to return to reside, in the confident expectation that
once they have met certain residency requirements,
they can expect the full complement of citizenship
rights to be protected. This view follows from how I
have understood the right to citizenship in the first
place, as protecting the strong interests that individuals
have in residential security, even (as in this case) for
citizens who are not presently residing on the territory
in question.
What does this general view mean for the difficult
case, in which a dual citizen with significant ties to coun-
try X but not Y commits a grievous crime? It means
that normal criminal procedures should be followed in
whichever jurisdiction the crime was committed. If the
states agree, a prison sentence can be served in X even
if the crime was in Y, as occurs in some criminal cases.
But there is no implication for the citizenship rights
of the perpetrator. If the normal procedures of Y are
to deny nonresident citizens rights such as voting, they
may do so in this case, but the crime is not relevant to
that decision. When the criminal justice procedure has
run its course, the dual-citizen should retain her rights
to residence in both states; no state has the right to
rescind citizenship.
CONCLUSION
I opened this article by noting the trend toward adopt-
ing and revitalizing laws that permit states to revoke
citizenship of individuals, in particular those who com-
mit grievous crimes. My objective here has been to
refute the set of arguments deployed in defense of a
state’s claimed power to revoke citizenship. In order to
make sense of these defenses, I have presented them in
clusters. One cluster of revocation defenses proposes
that these laws protect democratic states; I countered
these claims by arguing, rather, that there is insufficient
evidence to believe that revocation plays a protective
role in democratic states, and furthermore that revo-
cation is inconsistent with the principles that define
just punishment in democratic states. A second cluster
of revocation defenses targets dual nationals, empha-
sizing that dual citizenship is a kind of privilege that
can legitimately require compensation in the form of
liability to denationalization; I countered these claims
by noting that a commitment to the legitimacy of dual
citizenship requires accepting that loyalty to multiple
states is possible and permissible. Subjecting dual citi-
zens to the risk of revocation amounts to denying the
legitimacy of dual citizenship itself, by offering weaker
protection to their residential security than is offered
to citizens of only one state. Ultimately, I argued that
a clear understanding of the right to citizenship—as
protecting an individual from harm (internationally)
and as protecting an individual’s strong interests in
residential security (domestically)—makes denation-
alization unjustifiable in democratic states.
Globally, the fear of terrorism is palpable, and there
is no doubt that states are obligated to do what they
can to protect their citizens from harm. There is there-
fore nothing surprising about states demanding more
expansive powers to carry out this essential role. But re-
vocation laws, as well as laws making citizenship more
difficult to attain in democratic states, contribute to a
growing sense that citizenship as a meaningful status is
itself under threat. It is imperative that we resist both
of these trends. Citizenship is an essential right and a
foundational pillar of democracies; defending its status,
in the face of fear, is imperative.
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